Troy Darrington v. Stanley L. Wade, Janet Wade, Robert Iverson : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Troy Darrington v. Stanley L. Wade, Janet Wade,
Robert Iverson : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.; Maddox, Nelson and Snuffer; Counsel for Appellant.
A. Paul Schwenke; Johnson and Associates; Counsel for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Darrington v. Wade, No. 890274.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2630
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. CjQ&^H 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
TROY DARRINGTON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET 
WADE and ROBERT IVERSON, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
J \J 
Case No. 890274 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
MADDOX, NELSON & SNUFFER 
488 East 6400 South, Suite 120 
Murray, UT 84107 
(801) 263-2600 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: 
A. Paul Schwenke 
JOHNSON AND ASSOCIATES 
165 South West Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 531-1029 
FILED 
APR 2 3 1990 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
TROY DARRINGTON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET 
WADE and ROBERT IVERSON, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890274 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
MADDOX, NELSON & SNUFFER 
488 East 6400 South, Suite 120 
Murray, UT 84107 
(801) 263-2600 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: 
A. Paul Schwenke 
JOHNSON AND ASSOCIATES 
165 South West Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 531-1029 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities 
Statement of the Case 
Statement of Facts 
Argument 
Point Two 
Point Three 
Conclusion 
Mailing Certificate 
Page i 
Page ii 
Page 1 
Page 1 
Page 2 
Page 2 
Page 2 
Page 4 
Page 6 
i. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE CITATIONS 
Stephenson vs. Warner and Greenwood, Page 3 
581 P.2d, 567 (Utah 1978) 
RULES AND STATUTES 
Rules 59 and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Page 2 
ii. 
REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Appellant and pursuant to Rule 24(c) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, submits the following Reply 
Brief, This Reply Brief is limited to responding only to new 
matters set out in the Brief of the Appellee, Stanley L. Wade. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The lower Court twice entered Default Judgments against 
the Defendant Stanley Wade. A Default Judgment entered by prior 
Judge Dean Condor was reversed by the new Judge, Richard Moffat. 
Judge Moffat then entered a second Default Judgment only to set 
it aside. Judge Moffat then entered a Summary Judgment against 
the Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant Stanley Wade owned the skateboard park 
which is the subject of this claim. He leased it as a skateboard 
park to a tenant for the purposes of operating it as a skateboard 
park. 
The premises as they were leased were defective in that 
a drain cover was apparently omitted from the premises. 
The Plaintiff's injuries occurred within one month of 
the date the Defendant leased the premises. 
Since this is a review of a Summary Judgment, the 
Plaintiff is entitled to have all inferences drawn in favor of 
the Plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
The lower Court does not have unlimited authority to 
set aside its own Judgment. 
The lower Court entertained an untimely Motion to Set 
Aside a Judgment. There is no procedural rule which authorizes 
vacating a Judgment outside of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 59 and Rule 60(b). The cases cited by the Appellee do not 
stand for the proposition that timely requests are not required 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, they cite to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and require compliance therewith. 
Nothing in the cited cases supports the proposition that a lower 
Court can, without any regard to a timely filing of an 
appropriate Motion, merely set aside its Judgments. 
POINT TWO 
The Court appropriately struck the pleadings of the 
Defendant for its failure to cooperate in the discovery process. 
It was an abuse of discretion and beyond the authority of the 
lower Court to entertain an untimely Motion and to give the 
Defendant a "third bite at the apple". 
POINT THREE 
There are material issues of fact which, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, entitle Plaintiff to 
his day in Court. 
Assuming that the Court does not summarily re-enter 
Judgment against the Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled to have 
his day in Court. On Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff is entitled 
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to have the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. 
Both parties are in agreement as to the legal standard 
by which the actions of the landlord are to be measured. The 
standard is quoted in Defendants' Brief, page 7 where Defendants 
cite Stephenson vs. Warner and Greenwood, 581 P. 2d 567 (Utah 
1978) . The standard holds the landlord to exercise ordinary care 
and prudence. The landlord may be held liable for injuries 
caused by any defects or serious conditions which he created, or 
of which he was aware. It is a question of fact as to whether or 
not the landlord created the unreasonable condition or whether he 
knew of its existence one month previous to the injury when he 
leased the premises. In the present case the Plaintiff is 
entitled to have the facts construed in the light most favorable 
to him. The facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff, would support the inference that the missing drain 
cover was missing at the time that the property was leased by the 
landlord one month previous to the injuries. 
The Plaintiff is entitled to have a jury weigh the 
facts and decide whether or not the Defendant here has any 
responsibility for the injuries. It is a question of fact. A 
jury could reasonably conclude that leasing the premises without 
a drain cover was negligent. The question of whether or not the 
movement of the drain cover from one area to another is a matter 
for the defense to urge and for the jury to weigh. The absence 
of a drain cover in and of itself was negligent. The landlord 
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should not have leased the premises without securing drain covers 
for all of the drains on the leased premises. 
The Defendants1 argument that the condition came into 
existence after the lease is specious. The drain cover was 
missing at the time that the premises were leased by the 
landlord. The fact that the drain cover was moved from one place 
to another is reasonable and foreseeable. It is the absence of 
the drain cover which caused the movement of drain covers from 
one area to another. Had the landlord insured that all drains 
were properly covered at the outset, there would have been no 
need for the drain cover to be moved from one place to another. 
It was the landlord's negligence in failing to provide sufficient 
drain covers which created the hazard, and not the tenant's 
movement of a drain cover from one area to another. 
CONCLUSION 
The proceedings below were irregular, and the Court 
lacked authority to untimely set aside its Default Judgment. 
Since there was no timely motion filed by the Defendant below, 
and since the Rules do not contemplate any procedure which 
authorizes the lower Court to sit in appeal of itself, the lower 
Court erred in setting aside the Default Judgment. This Court 
should reenter the Default Judgment, and it should be a final, 
unappealable decision. 
The lower Court also erred in granting Summary Judgment 
against Plaintiff. From the facts viewed in the light most 
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favorable to Plaintiff, Summary Judgment should not issue. 
DATED this ^-- day_of April, 1990, 
/ / ' 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
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